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ABSTRACT
We study a problem where a group of agents has to de-
cide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We
focus on settings where the share that each agent receives
depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning
that agent’s contribution to the group. To this end, we in-
troduce a mechanism to elicit and aggregate subjective opin-
ions as well as for determining agents’ shares. The intuition
behind the proposed mechanism is that each agent who be-
lieves that the others are telling the truth has its expected
share maximized to the extent that it is well-evaluated by its
peers and that it is truthfully reporting its opinions. Under
the assumptions that agents are Bayesian decision-makers
and that the underlying population is sufficiently large, we
show that our mechanism is incentive-compatible, budget-
balanced, and tractable. We also present strategies to make
this mechanism individually rational and fair.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial In-
telligence—Multiagent systems;
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics
General Terms
Economics, Theory
Keywords
Fair division, Bayesian Truth Serum, Mechanism Design
1. INTRODUCTION
Understanding how agents can work together in order to
achieve some common goal is a central research topic in the
field of multiagent systems [15]. Questions that are typically
analyzed include how and which groups of agents should
form [13], how agents should coordinate their actions once
they have agreed to work together [4], how to ensure that
the group, once formed, does not disintegrate [2], and how
any joint rewards should be divided among the group mem-
bers [9]. It is this last question that we address in this paper.
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Commonly called fair division, the problem of dividing
one or several goods among a set of agents, in a way that
satisfies a suitable fairness criterion, has been studied in
several literatures. In economics, the collective welfare ap-
proach is arguably the most influential application of the
economic analysis to fair division. It uses the concepts of
collective utility functions, in its cardinal interpretation, and
social welfare orderings, in its ordinal interpretation, for de-
ciding what makes a reasonable division [9]. In computer
science and, more specifically, artificial intelligence, the fair
division problem is traditionally studied in settings where
the underlying agents not only have preferences over alter-
native allocations of goods, but also actively participate in
computing an allocation [1].
In this work, we propose a novel game-theoretic model for
sharing a joint, homogeneous reward based on the idea of
subjective opinions. In detail, we consider scenarios where
a group has been formed and has accomplished a task for
which it is granted a reward, which must be shared among
the group members. After observing the individual contri-
butions of the peers in accomplishing the task, each agent is
asked to evaluate the others. Agents also provide predictions
about how their peers are evaluated. Thus, we consider two
kinds of subjective opinions when sharing the joint reward:
evaluations and predictions. These opinions are elicited and
aggregated by a central, trusted entity called the mecha-
nism, which is also responsible for sharing the reward based
exclusively on the received opinions.
The share received by each agent from the proposed mech-
anism has two major components. The first one reflects the
evaluations received by that agent. The second one is a
truth-telling score used to encourage agents to truthfully
report their opinions. For computing such scores, the mech-
anism uses the Bayesian truth serum method [12]. The intu-
ition behind the proposed mechanism is that each agent who
believes that the others are telling the truth has its expected
share maximized to the extent that it is well-evaluated and
that it is also telling the truth. Under the assumptions that
agents are Bayesian decision-makers and that the underlying
population is sufficiently large, we show that our mechanism
is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, and tractable. We
also present strategies to make this mechanism individually
rational and fair.
Besides this introductory section, the rest of this paper is
organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model,
concepts used throughout the paper, and properties that we
wish our mechanism to exhibit. In Section 3, we introduce
our mechanism and prove that it satisfies interesting prop-
erties. In Section 4, we empirically investigate the influence
of the model and mechanism’s parameters on agents’ shares.
In Section 5, we review the literature related to our work.
Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, for n ≥ 3, has accom-
plished a task for which it is granted a reward V ∈ ℜ+.
Every agent is assumed to want more of the reward. There-
fore, we can identify an agent’s share with its welfare. We
are interested in settings where the share of V that an agent
receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers con-
cerning that agent’s contribution to the group.
We model the private information of an agent as n − 1
private signals that the agent receives from its peers. These
signals are direct assessments of the peers’ performance in
accomplishing the joint task, and we call them truthful eval-
uations. Formally, given a positive integer parameter M ,
for 1 ≤ M ≤ V , the signals observed by agent i are repre-
sented by the vector ti = (t
1
i , . . . , t
i−1
i , t
i+1
i , . . . , t
n
i ), where
tji ∈ {1, . . . ,M} represents the signal observed by agent i
coming from agent j. Thus, ti is the vector with the truth-
ful evaluations made by agent i regarding the contributions
of its peers in accomplishing the task. In this way, the pa-
rameter M represents the top possible evaluation that an
agent can give or receive, and we assume that its value is
common knowledge. For each agent j ∈ N , let ωj ∈ ∆M
(unit simplex in ℜM ) be an unknown parameter represent-
ing the distribution of the truthful evaluations for agent j.
Based on their truthful evaluations, agents can make pre-
dictions about how their peers are evaluated. The predic-
tions made by agent i are formally represented by the vector
ri = (r
1
i , . . . , r
i−1
i , r
i+1
i , . . . , r
n
i ), where agent i’s prediction
about the empirical distribution of evaluations received by
agent j is rji = (r
j1
i , . . . , r
jM
i ) ∈ ∆M , i.e., 0 ≤ rj
k
i ≤ 1
and
∑M
k=1 r
jk
i = 1. Mathematically, r
j
i is the expected dis-
tribution of truthful evaluations for agent j given agent i’s
truthful evaluation, i.e., rji = E[ωj |tji ].
To avoid a biased self-judgment, agents are neither asked
to make self-evaluations nor asked to make predictions about
their received evaluations. They are requested to report
their subjective opinions, namely, evaluations and predic-
tions. We make the following assumptions in our model:
1. Self-interestedness. Agents act to maximize their ex-
pected shares.
2. Common prior. ∀j ∈ N , there exists a common prior
distribution, p(ωj), over ωj .
3. Rationality. Every agent i, with truthful evaluation
tji , forms a posterior by applying Bayes’ rule to the
common prior p(ωj), i.e., p(ωj|tji ).
4. Stochastic relevance. ∀i, q, j ∈ N, p(ωj |tji ) = p(ωj |tjq)
if and only if tji = t
j
q.
5. Large population. The population of agents must be
sufficiently large so that a single evaluation for an agent
cannot significantly affect the empirical distribution of
evaluations received by that agent.
6. Independent signals. The signals observed by an agent
are independent of each other. Formally, given i, j, k ∈
N , and x, y ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, p(tji = x | tki = y) = p(tji =
x).
The first assumption means that agents are risk neutral
[7]. The second assumption means that agents have common
prior distributions over the distributions of the truthful eval-
uations for their peers. The third assumption means that
these priors are consistent with Bayesian updating. These
first three assumptions are traditional in both game the-
ory [11] and multiagent systems [15] literature, and they
essentially mean that agents are Bayesian decision-makers.
The fourth assumption means that different truthful evalua-
tions imply different posterior distributions, and vice-versa.
By far, the most stringent assumption is the requirement
of a large population. Later in this paper, we discuss the
implications of such assumption and how to circumvent it.
Finally, the last assumption implies that the truthful evalu-
ation of an agent for a peer does not influence that agent’s
truthful evaluation for other peer.
A consequence of self-interest is that agents may delib-
erately lie when reporting their evaluations and/or predic-
tions. For example, an agent may intentionally give all
other agents a low evaluation so that, in comparison, it
looks good and receives a greater share of V . Therefore,
we distinguish between the truthful evaluations made by
each agent i ∈ N , ti, and the evaluations that agent i re-
ports, xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
i−1
i , x
i+1
i , . . . , x
n
i ). Similarly, we distin-
guish between the truthful predictions made by each agent
i ∈ N , ri, and the predictions that agent i reports, yi =
(y1i , . . . , y
i−1
i , y
i+1
i , . . . , y
n
i ).
We define the strategy of agent i, si = (xi,yi), to be its
reported opinions. Si is the set of strategies available to
agent i, and S = S1× . . .×Sn. We note that the parameter
M fully determines the strategies available to the agents.
Each vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S is a strategy profile. As
customary, let the subscript “−i” denote a vector without
agent i’s component, e.g., s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
If the opinions reported by agent i are equal to its truthful
opinions, i.e., xi = ti and yi = ri, then we say that agent
i’s strategy is truthful.
Opinions are elicited and aggregated by a central, trusted
entity called the mechanism, which is also responsible for
sharing the reward among the agents. This entity relies only
on the reported opinions when determining agents’ shares,
and so it has no additional information. Formally:
Definition 1 (Mechanism). A mechanism is a shar-
ing function, Γ : S → ℜn, which maps each strategy profile
to a vector of shares.
We denote the share of V given to agent i, when all the
reported opinions are s, by Γi(s). We use Γi when s is either
irrelevant or clear from the context. Throughout this paper,
we use the solution concept called Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Bayes-Nash equilibrium). We say
that the strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium if for each agent i, and strategy s′i 6= si ∈ Si,
E [Γi(si, s−i)|ti, ri] ≥ E [Γi(s′i, s−i)|ti, ri].
In words, for each agent i ∈ N , si is the best response, in
an expected sense, that agent i has to s−i given its truth-
ful opinions (ti, ri). The expectation in taken with respect
to the posterior distributions. When the inequality in Def-
inition 2 holds strictly (with “>” instead of “≥”), then the
strategy profile s is called a strict Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Properties
There are several key properties we wish mechanisms to
have. We introduce them in this subsection.
Definition 3 (Fairness). Consider a strategy profile
s ∈ S in which the reported evaluation of every agent z for
agent i is paired up with agent z’s reported evaluation for
agent j, for i 6= j 6= z ∈ N , so that xiz > xjz. Further, the
evaluations of agent i and agent j for each other are paired
up, so that xij > x
j
i . Then, we say that a mechanism is fair
if Γi(s) > Γj(s).
In words, if an agent unanimously receives better evalu-
ations than a peer, then that agent should also receive a
greater share of the joint reward than its peer.
Definition 4 (Budget Balance). A mechanism is
budget-balanced if ∀s ∈ S,∑n
i=1 Γi(s) = V .
In words, a budget-balanced mechanism allocates the en-
tire reward V back to the agents. As stated, this is a strong
definition because we do not put constraints on s, e.g., we
do not require s to be an equilibrium strategy profile.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality). A mecha-
nism is individually rational if ∀i ∈ N,∀s ∈ S,Γi(s) ≥ 0.
This condition requires the share received by each agent to
be greater than or equal to zero. In other words, all agents
are weakly better off participating in the mechanism than
not participating at all.
Definition 6 (Incentive Compatibility). A mecha-
nism is incentive-compatible if collective truth-telling is an
equilibrium strategy profile.
Since we are working with Bayes-Nash equilibrium, an
incentive-compatible mechanism implies that it is best, in
an expected sense, for each agent to tell the truth provided
that the others are also doing so.
Definition 7 (Tractability). A mechanism is trac-
table if it computes agents’ shares in polynomial time.
By no means do we argue that the properties defined in
this section are exhaustive. However, we believe that they
are among the most desirable ones in practical applications.
2.2 The Bayesian Truth Serum Method
Prelec [12] proposes an incentive-compatible scoring meth-
od, called the Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), which works
on a single multiple-choice question with a finite number
of alternatives. Each responder is requested to endorse the
answer mostly likely to be true and to predict the empirical
distribution of the endorsed answers.
Responders are evaluated by the accuracy of their predic-
tions (how well they matched the empirical frequency) as
well as how surprisingly common their answers are. For ex-
ample, an answer endorsed by 50% of the population against
a predicted frequency of 25% is surprisingly common. The
responders who endorsed that answer should receive a high
score. If predictions averaged 75%, an answer endorsed by
50% of the population would be surprisingly uncommon and,
consequently, the responders who endorsed it would receive
a lower score. The surprisingly common criterion exploits
the false consensus effect to promote truthfulness, i.e., the
general tendency of responders to overestimate the degree
of agreement that the others have with them [14].
In our work, the BTS method is used exclusively as a
tool to promote truthfulness. This method is very conve-
nient because it does not require objective answers to score
opinions, i.e., it is possible to work with subjective infor-
mation, where an absolute truth is practically unknowable,
and still be able to reward truthfulness. Questions that are
considered in our work have the form: “What is the evalu-
ation deserved by agent j?”, where the possible answers are
values inside the set {1, . . . ,M}. For illustration purpose,
consider a question asking for the evaluation deserved by
agent j. Using the notation previously defined, let h(xji , k)
be a zero-one indicator function, i.e.,
h(xji , k) =
{
1 if xji = k,
0 otherwise.
The score returned by the BTS method to agent i, given
its reported evaluation xji and prediction y
j
i , is calculated as
follows:
R(i, j) =
M∑
k=1
h(xji , k) ln
x¯k
y¯k
+
M∑
k=1
x¯k ln
(1− ǫ)yjki + ǫM
x¯k
, (1)
where x¯k is the average frequency of evaluation k, and y¯k is
the geometric average of the predicted frequencies of evalu-
ation k:
x¯k = (1− ǫ)

 1
n− 1
∑
q 6=j
h(xjq, k)

+ ǫ
M
y¯k = exp

 1
n− 1
∑
q 6=j
ln
(
(1− ǫ)yjkq + ǫ
M
)
and ǫ, for 0 < ǫ < 1, is a recalibration coefficient to adjust
predictions and averages away from 0/1 extreme values.
The BTS method has two major components. The first
one, called the information score, evaluates the evaluation
given by agent i to agent j according to the log-ratio of
its actual-to-predicted endorsement frequencies. An evalua-
tion scores high to the extent that it is more common than
collectively predicted. The second component, called the
prediction score, is a penalty proportional to the relative en-
tropy between the empirical distribution of evaluations for
agent j and agent i’s prediction of that distribution. For a
small ǫ, the best prediction score is attained when a reported
prediction matches the empirical distribution of evaluations.
It is interesting to note that Equation 1 is slightly different
from the original BTS method, which uses ǫ = 0. By using a
small recalibration coefficient, we can avoid problems related
to values that are not well-defined, e.g., ln(0) and ln(0/0).
Any distortion in incentives can be made arbitrarily small
by making ǫ sufficiently small. Under the assumptions made
in the beginning of this section, and using Equation 1 to
compute agents’ scores, the following theorems hold [12]:
Theorem 1. Collective truth-telling is a strict Bayes-Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. The BTS method is zero-sum.
Theorem 1 means that the strict best response of an agent,
in an expected sense, when everyone else is telling the truth
is also to tell the truth. Theorem 2 means that the sum
of the scores received by the agents is equal to zero, i.e.,∑
i6=j R(i, j) = 0. In what follows, we provide bounds for
the scores returned by the BTS method.
Lemma 1. ∀i 6= j, R(i, j) ∈ [−2 ln(M
ǫ
), ln(M
ǫ
)
]
.
Proof. We start by noting that:
0 <
ǫ
M
≤ x¯k, y¯k ≤ 1− ǫ+ ǫ
M
< 1.
Focusing first on the lower-bound, we analyze each part of
Equation 1 separately. Starting with the information score,
we have:
M∑
k=1
h(xji , k) ln
x¯k
y¯k
≥
M∑
k=1
h(xji , k) ln x¯k (2)
≥ ln ǫ
M
,
where the inequalities follow, respectively, from the facts
that 0 < y¯k < 1, and
ǫ
M
≤ x¯k < 1. Moving to the prediction
score, we have:
M∑
k=1
x¯k ln
(1− ǫ)yjki + ǫM
x¯k
≥
M∑
k=1
x¯k ln
ǫ
M
(3)
=
(
1− ǫ + ǫ
M
)
ln
ǫ
M
≥ ln ǫ
M
,
where the first inequality follows from the facts that 0 <
x¯k < 1 and (1 − ǫ)yj
k
i ≥ 0. The second inequality follows
from the facts that ln(ǫ/M) < 0, and 0 <
(
1− ǫ + ǫ
M
)
< 1.
Joining (2) and (3), we have:
R(i, j) ≥ 2 ln ǫ
M
= −2 ln M
ǫ
.
Focusing now on the upper-bound of Equation 1, we start
by analyzing the information score:
M∑
k=1
h(xji , k) ln
x¯k
y¯k
≤
M∑
k=1
h(xji , k) ln
1
y¯k
(4)
≤ ln 1ǫ
M
= ln
M
ǫ
,
The inequalities follow from the fact that ǫ
M
≤ x¯k, y¯k < 1.
Moving to the prediction score, we note that its value is
always less than or equal to zero, because it can be seen
as the negative of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is
always greater than or equal to zero [3]. Thus, we have:
R(i, j) ≤ ln M
ǫ
.
3. THE MECHANISM
In this section, we propose a mechanism for sharing re-
wards based on subjective opinions. It starts by requesting
both evaluations and predictions from the agents. For each
vector with evaluations, xi, the mechanism creates another
vector, χi = (χ
1
i , . . . , χ
i−1
i , χ
i+1
i , . . . , χ
n
i ), by scaling the ele-
ments of xi so that they sum up to V . Mathematically,
∀i, j, χji = xji
(
V∑
q 6=i x
q
i
)
. (5)
This simple pre-processing step ensures that the sum of
the resulting shares is not orders of magnitude lower than
the reward V . The share received by each agent i ∈ N from
the mechanism has two major components. The first one,
χ¯i, reflects agent i’s received evaluations. It is calculated
by summing the scaled evaluations received by agent i, and
dividing the sum by n, i.e.,
χ¯i =
∑
j 6=i χ
i
j
n
. (6)
This simple idea of aggregating the scaled evaluations for
an agent by summing them and dividing by n helps to en-
sure important properties for the mechanism. The second
component of agent i’s share is a truth-telling score. The in-
tuition behind such scores is that agents who believe that the
others are telling the truth maximize their expected scores
by also telling the truth. The score of agent i, ζi, is calcu-
lated as follows:
ζi =
∑
j 6=i R(i, j)
n− 1 , (7)
where R(i, j) is defined in Equation 1. Agent i’s score is
then the arithmetic mean of results returned by the Bayesian
truth serum method, where each result is directly related to
an evaluation and a prediction reported by agent i. Finally,
the share of agent i is a linear combination of χ¯i and ζi, i.e.,
Γi = χ¯
i + α ζi, (8)
where the constant α, for α > 0, fine-tunes the weight given
to the truth-telling score ζi. Its value has an important role
in ensuring desirable properties for the mechanism.
The intuition behind the proposed mechanism is that agents
who believe that the others are truthfully reporting have
their expected shares maximized to the extent that they are
well-evaluated and that they are also telling the truth. It
is interesting to note that despite the assumptions of prior
and posterior distributions, they are neither known nor re-
quested by the mechanism, only evaluations and predictions
are elicited from agents.
3.1 Numerical Example
A numerical example may clarify the mechanics of the pro-
posed mechanism. Consider six agents indexed by the letters
A,B,C,D,E, F, a joint reward V = 1000, and assume that
M = 2. The reported predictions and evaluations can be
seen, respectively, in Table 1 and Table 2.
In Table 1, each numeric cell can be interpreted as the
prediction made by the agent in the row about the percent-
age of agents that give the evaluation in the second row of
Table 1: Numerical example: reported predictions.
A B C D E F
“1” “2” “1” “2” “1” “2” “1” “2” “1” “2” “1” “2”
A - - 0 1 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.8
B 0.8 0.2 - - 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 1 0 0.4 0.6
C 0.8 0.2 0 1 - - 0.4 0.6 1 0 0.4 0.6
D 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 - - 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6
E 0.8 0.2 0 1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 - - 0.4 0.6
F 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 - -
the cell’s column (“1” or “2”) to the agent in the first row
of the cell’s column. For example, the emphasized number
0.8 means that agent B predicts that 80% of the population
gives the evaluation 1 to agent A.
In Table 2, each numeric cell can be interpreted as the
evaluation given by the agent in the row to the agent in the
column. For example, the emphasized number 2 represents
xBA , i.e., the evaluation given by agent A to agent B.
Using these evaluations and predictions, and the parame-
ters α = 100 and ǫ = 0.01, the mechanism returns the shares
shown in the last column of Table 3. The major components
of these shares are shown in the first columns. For illustra-
tion’s sake, consider the share received by agent F . To com-
pute the first component of ΓF , the mechanism aggregates
the scaled evaluations received by agent F (Equation 6):
χ¯F =
142.86 + 250.00 + 285.71 + 250.00 + 222.22
6
≈ 191.80.
The second component of ΓF is the arithmetic mean of
results returned by the BTS method, where each result is
directly related to an evaluation and a prediction submitted
by agent F (Equation 7):
ζF =
R(F,A) + R(F,B) + R(F, C) + R(F,D) + R(F,E)
5
≈ 0.58 − 1.19− 0.18 − 0.11 − 0.11
5
≈ −0.21.
Finally, the share received by agent F from the mechanism
is a linear combination of χ¯F and ζF :
ΓF = χ¯
F + α ζF
= 191.80 + 100× (−0.21)
= 170.80.
Table 2: Numerical example: reported evaluations.
A B C D E F
A - 2 2 1 1 1
B 1 - 2 2 1 2
C 1 2 - 1 1 2
D 1 2 2 - 1 2
E 2 2 1 2 - 2
F 2 2 1 2 1 -
Table 3: Numerical example: resulting shares.
χ¯i ζi Γi
A 144.18 0.05 149.18
B 215.61 -0.06 209.61
C 170.30 0.09 179.30
D 167.99 -0.02 165.99
E 110.12 0.15 125.12
F 191.80 -0.21 170.80
3.2 Properties
In this subsection, we show that the proposed mechanism
satisfies important properties.
Proposition 1. The mechanism is budget-balanced.
Proof. The sum of the shares received by the agents is
equal to:
n∑
i=1
(
χ¯i + α ζi
)
=
n∑
i=1
χ¯i + α
n∑
i=1
ζi
=
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i χ
i
j
n
+ α
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i R(i, j)
n− 1
=
n∑
j=1
∑
i6=j χ
i
j
n
+ α
n∑
j=1
∑
i6=j R(i, j)
n− 1
= n
(
V
n
)
+
α
n− 1

 n∑
j=1
∑
i6=j
R(i, j)

 .
The last equality follows from the fact that the scaled
evaluations sum up to V (Equation 5). From Theorem 2, we
know that
∑
i6=j R(i, j) = 0, thus completing the proof.
Proposition 2. The mechanism is incentive-compatible.
Proof (Sketch). Due to space limitations, we only pro-
vide a sketch of the proof. Suppose that every peer of an
agent i ∈ N is truthfully reporting its opinions. We prove
that the strict best response for agent i, in an expected sense,
is also to tell the truth. We start by observing that the
share received by agent i (Equation 8) can be written as
c1 + c2
∑
j 6=i R(i, j), where c1 and c2 are positive constants,
from agent i’s point of view, because they do not depend
on the opinions reported by agent i. Due to the assumption
of independent signals (Assumption 6, Section 2), we can
restrict ourselves to find the strategy of agent i that maxi-
mizes E [c1 + c2R(i, j)] = c1 + c2E [R(i, j)], which in turn is
strictly maximized when agent i tells the truth (Theorem
1). Thus, the mechanism is incentive-compatible.
Proposition 3. The mechanism is tractable.
Proof. The pre-processing step (Equation 5) is computed
in O(n2). Thereafter, for each agent i ∈ N , Equation 6
is computed in O(n), Equation 7 is computed in O(n2M)
(since Equation 1 can be computed in O(nM)), and Equa-
tion 8 is computed in O(1). Thus, the mechanism runs in
O(n3M) time.
Proposition 4. If M ≤ √n− 2 and α ≤ V
3Mn2 ln(Mǫ )
,
then the mechanism is fair.
Proof. Consider a pair of agents i, j ∈ N and a strategy
profile s ∈ S where xij > xji and, for every other agent
z 6= i, j, xiz > xjz. For the mechanism to be considered fair,
its resulting shares must satisfy the following inequality:
Γi(s) > Γj(s) ≡ χ¯i + α ζi > χ¯j + α ζj
≡ α < χ¯
i − χ¯j
ζj − ζi . (9)
In what follows, we compute a lower-bound for the above
fraction. Starting with the numerator, we have:
χ¯i − χ¯j =
∑
z 6=i,j
(
xiz − xjz
) (
V∑
q 6=z x
q
z
)
+ xij
(
V∑
q 6=j x
q
j
)
n
−
xji
(
V∑
q 6=i x
q
i
)
n
≥ V
n
(
n− 2
(n− 1)M +
1
(n− 1)M −
M
(n− 1)
)
=
V
n
(
n− 2 + 1−M2
(n− 1)M
)
≥ V
n(n− 1)M
≥ V
n2M
.
The first inequality follows from the facts that for every
agent z 6= i, j, xiz > xjz and ∀i, j, xji ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The
second inequality follows from the assumption that M ≤√
n− 2. Focusing on the denominator of the fraction in (9),
since ∀q ∈ N, ζq is the average of n − 1 results from the
BTS method, then the difference between ζj and ζi is always
less than or equal to the difference between the highest and
the lowest scores that can be returned by the BTS method
(Equation 1), which is equal to 3 ln
(
M
ǫ
)
according to Lemma
1. Thus, we conclude that if:
α ≤ V
3Mn2 ln
(
M
ǫ
) ,
and M ≤ √n− 2, then the proposed mechanism is fair.
Intuitively, this proposition means that the proposed mech-
anism can be made fair by reducing the influence of the
truth-telling scores on agents’ shares, so that these shares
will depend almost entirely on the reported evaluations.
Proposition 5. If α ≤ V
2Mn ln(Mǫ )
, then the mechanism
is individually rational.
Proof. We start the proof by observing that ∀i ∈ N, χ¯i ≥
0 (Equation 6). Consequently, if agents’ scores are positive,
then their shares will also be positive. So, we restrict our-
selves to the scenario where truth-telling scores are negative.
Thus, for every agent i ∈ N , the following inequality must
be true when ζi < 0:
χ¯i + α ζi ≥ 0 ≡ χ¯
i
−ζi ≥ α. (10)
In what follows, we compute a lower-bound for the frac-
tion in (10). Starting with the numerator, we have:
χ¯i =
∑
j 6=i x
i
j
(
V∑
q 6=j x
q
j
)
n
≥
∑
j 6=i x
i
j
(
V
M (n−1)
)
n
≥ V (n− 1)
M n(n− 1)
The inequalities follow from the fact ∀i, j, xji ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
Focusing on the denominator of the fraction in (10), since ζi
is the average of n−1 results from the BTS method, we can
restrict ourselves to find the lowest negative score that can
be returned by the BTS method. From Lemma 1, we know
that this value is −2 ln (M
ǫ
)
. Thus, we conclude that if:
α ≤ V
2Mn ln
(
M
ǫ
) ,
then the proposed mechanism is individually rational.
Since agents’ scores can be negative, the above proposi-
tion means that the resulting shares can always be positive,
regardless the reported evaluations and predictions, if we
reduce the influence of these scores on agents’ shares.
4. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we report an empirical investigation of
the influence of the model and mechanism’s parameters on
agents’ shares. In all experiments reported here, agents’
truthful evaluations are drawn from the probability distri-
bution of the random variable H = ⌈MB⌉, where B is Beta-
distributed with parameters α = β = 0.5, i.e., B has a
symmetric, U-shaped distribution. For creating a random
prediction, we use the empirical distribution of n− 1 evalu-
ations drawn from the probability distribution of H. Thus,
the experiments reflect scenarios where most of the agents
have extreme opinions. Lastly, agents always report their
opinions truthfully.
4.1 Parameter M
The parameterM defines the range of possible evaluations
that an agent can give or receive. To better understand
the influence of different values of M on agents’ shares, we
performed the following experiment. We shared the reward
V = 1000 among 100 agents using the proposed mechanism
and the following values forM : 2, 5, 7, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100. We
used the parameters α = 10 and ǫ = 10−4, and we observed
the mean and the standard deviation of the resulting shares
for different values of M . Figure 1 shows the results.
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Figure 1: Results of the experiment with different
values for M . Average shares are represented by
black squares, and standard deviations by gray lines.
The dotted line is used to facilitate visualization.
As can be seen in Figure 1, as M increases, the standard
deviation of the resulting shares also increases. Intuitively,
this happens because the reported evaluations become more
fine-grained, in that small differences between agents are rec-
ognized and specified by their peers, thus resulting in more
diverse shares. It is important to note that this increased ex-
pressivity may be burdensome for the agents since they will
have more possibilities to evaluate their peers, thus mak-
ing the evaluation process more challenging. We argue that
the underlying application may help to determine appropri-
ate settings for M . Since the mechanism is budget-balanced
and we used a fairly large population in this experiment, the
average share stayed constant for different values of M .
4.2 Parameter α
The parameter α of the proposed mechanism fine-tunes
the weight given to the truth-telling scores. To better under-
stand its influence on agents’ shares, we performed the fol-
lowing experiment. We shared the reward V = 1000 among
100 agents using the parameters M = 10, ǫ = 10−4, and
α ∈ {0.1, 1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 500}. We ran this experiment
100 times. We observed the total number of unfair shares
and the total number of negative shares returned by the
mechanism for different values of α. An agent’s share is
considered unfair if that agent unanimously receives better
evaluations than a peer, but its share is smaller than the
peer’s share. Thus, a mechanism is fair if it does not return
unfair shares (see Definition 3). To compute the number of
unfair shares, we made a pairwise comparison in each sim-
ulation step in which each returned share was compared to
each other for determining whether the former was unfair or
not. Table 4 presents the results of this experiment.
Table 4: Results of the experiment with different
values for α.
α Unfair shares Negative shares
0.1 0 0
1 0 0
5 0 0
10 0 0
25 0 0
50 0 0
100 0 8
500 0 2543
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Figure 2: Results of the experiment with different
values for n. Black squares represent averages of the
sum of the shares, and gray lines represent standard
deviations. The dotted line is used to facilitate vi-
sualization.
According to Proposition 4 and 5, we need to set α <
2.9 × 10−4 to mathematically ensure that the mechanism
will be fair, and α < 0.044 to mathematically ensure that the
returned shares will always be greater than or equal to zero.
From Table 4, we note that even with much higher values
for α, the mechanism did not return a single unfair share in
this experiment. Further, the mechanism did not return a
single negative share for α ≤ 50. This discrepancy between
experiment and theory can be ascribed to the fact that the
bounds for α are calculated based on worst-case scenarios,
which are very unlikely to happen in practical applications.
This implies that it is possible to promote truthfulness by
using high values for α and still be able to obtain individual
rationality and fairness.
4.3 Parameter n
The most stringent assumption made in this work is that
the population of agents is large. This assumption is nec-
essary for the proposed mechanism to be able to use the
BTS method. We performed an experiment to investigate
how this mechanism behaves when dealing with populations
of different sizes. In detail, we studied how the size of the
population affects the budget of the mechanism. We shared
the reward V = 1000 using the parameters M = 10, α = 10,
ǫ = 10−4, and n ∈ {5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 150}. We executed the
experiment 100 times. At the end of each simulation step,
we computed the sum of the returned shares for each value
of n. At the end of the experiment, we computed the av-
erages and the standard deviations of these sums. Figure 2
shows the results.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the mechanism loses more
when n ≤ M . Intuitively, since there are few agents to en-
dorse a larger number of possible evaluations, the reported
evaluations are very often surprisingly common. This im-
plies higher truth-telling scores for the agents and, conse-
quently, greater shares. Alternatively, agents’ scores are
more balanced when n > M . Since there are more agents
than evaluations to be endorsed, the reported evaluations
are not very often surprisingly common. Consequently, the
average truth-telling score is not so high, and the mecha-
nism’s loss gradually decreases. An ANOVA test confirms
that n does indeed influence the resulting shares (ρ < 0.0001).
The standard deviation of the sum of the shares also de-
creases when n increases, thus supporting our claim that
the scores are more balanced.
In conclusion, we note that a possible way to circumvent
the assumption of a large population is to reduce the num-
ber of possible evaluations, i.e., to reduce the value of the
parameter M . In this way, the influence of a single agent
on the empirical distributions of evaluations may be reduced
since these distributions will probably (but not necessarily)
be more balanced. We suggest that a good rule of thumb
is to use a value for the parameter M ≤ √n− 2, because
at this point the number of different evaluations seems to
be sufficiently smaller than the number of agents. Also, a
value for M satisfying this inequality helps to mathemati-
cally ensure fairness (Proposition 4). This rule has a strong
empirical support in our experiment because the loss taken
by the mechanism is negligible when the inequality is satis-
fied, i.e., for n = 100 and n = 150.
5. RELATED WORK
Fair division has long been studied in cooperative game
theory. The Shapley value [11] is a key concept used in this
field to distribute a joint surplus (or cost) among a set of
agents. Roughly speaking, the Shapley value assigns a share
to each agent equal to that agent’s marginal contribution to
the group. We note that sharing schemes based on marginal
contributions, like the Shapley value, are not appropriate in
our setting. The idea of marginal contribution is not objec-
tively defined in our model because individual contributions
are subjective information.
In the context of cooperative learning, Oakley et al. [10]
propose some guidelines to the effective design and manage-
ment of teams of students. Slightly different from our model,
each team member receives a common grade as the result of
a joint academic work. These grades are adjusted through
peer ratings (evaluations) to account for individual perfor-
mance. In detail, a team grade is weighted by the average
evaluation that a student receives to determine his or her fi-
nal grade. A total of 9 verbal evaluations are used, which are
later converted to values inside the set {0, 12.5, 25, ...100}.
Differently from our work, this rating scheme allows agents
to make self-evaluations. Further, it does not promote truth-
fulness. Kaufman et al. [6] discuss the problems that may
arise when using this rating system, e.g., inflated self-evalua-
tions and gender and racial bias. We believe that these prob-
lems may be even worse in our scenario because there is a
joint reward to be shared, and not a common team grade.
Hence, the BTS method is an important component of
our mechanism. We note that similar incentive-compatible
methods which would require less information from the agents
(i.e., only evaluations) could have been used (e.g., [8, 5]).
However, most of these methods are not budget-balanced,
which we believe is an important property in our setting.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic model for
sharing a joint, homogeneous reward based on the idea of
subjective opinions. Each agent is asked to evaluate its peers
as well as to predict how they will be evaluated. We intro-
duced a mechanism to aggregate and use such opinions for
determining agents’ shares. The intuition behind the pro-
posed mechanism is that each agent who believes that the
others are telling the truth has its expected share maximized
to the extent that it is well-evaluated and that it is truthfully
reporting its opinions. Under the assumptions that agents
are Bayesian decision-makers and that the underlying popu-
lation of agents is sufficiently large, we showed that the pro-
posed mechanism is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced,
and tractable. We also presented strategies to make this
mechanism individually rational and fair.
We implicitly assumed that agents are not participating in
collusive agreements. However, there are many reasons why
an agent may lie to benefit a peer. For example, in exchange
for misreporting its evaluation, which may lead to a lower
share for itself, a liar agent may receive a side-payment from
the agent who benefits from the misreporting. Thus, an
exciting direction for future research work is to study which
kinds of collusive behavior may arise and how to avoid them.
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